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a b s t r a c t 
Several methodologies based on ISO/IEC 27000 international standard have been developed to deal with risk analysis in information systems (IS). These 
methodologies do not, however, consider imprecise val-uations, but use precise values on different, usually percentage, scales. 
We propose an extension of the MAGERIT methodology based on classical fuzzy computational models. A linguistic term scale is used to represent asset 
values, their dependencies and frequency and asset deg-radation associated with threats. Computations are based on trapezoidal fuzzy numbers associated 
with linguistic terms. A similarity function is used to associate a linguistic term on the previously defined scale to the trapezoidal fuzzy numbers resulting 
from computations. Finally, regarding the selection of preven-tive safeguards to reduce risks in IS, we propose a dynamic programming-based method that 
incorpo-rates simulated annealing to tackle optimizations problems with the aim of minimizing costs while keeping the risk at acceptable levels. 
An example of an administrative unit using in-house and third-party information systems internally and to provide public information services is 
used to illustrate the methodology. 
1 . In t roduc t ion 
Information systems (IS) are composed of a set of data manage-
ment e lements designed to provide services and benefits in areas 
as far a part as public administration, industrial control, banking 
or geographical and weather information. 
Technological developments and universal internet access have 
led to an increase in system vulnerabilities, since organizations 
have connected ISs to corporate and even public networks to which 
non-authorized personnel could have access unless appropriate 
action is taken. Besides, people within the organization have to 
be trained in and aware of IS support technology, as technology 
misuse can cause disastrous failures. 
On top of these vulnerabilities caused by recent technological 
developments, there are other traditional issues, such as integrity 
facilities or the custody of not necessarily digital documents , on 
which new technologies have also had an impact. Therefore, ISs 
have to be analysed with a view to risk minimization by means 
of well-planned actions to protect information, processes and 
services from possible threats . Threats range from acts of terror-
ism, industrial espionage, etc. to a simple unintentional human 
error by an operator. 
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International s tandards establishing requirements for the 
certification of security information management systems (SIMS) 
originated in the BS 7799 security standard, proposed by the 
British Standards Institution (BSI). The first part of the standard 
(BS 7799-1), published in 1995, provided for the first t ime a set 
of best practices for managing the security of information to be 
used by any company or organization, whereas the second part 
(BS 7799-2) sets out SIMS requirements for certification by 
independent auditors. 
In 1999, the ISO/IEC JTC 1 commit tee accepted the BS 7799-1 
without major changes as ISO/IEC 17799, which was renumbered 
as ISO/IEC 27002 in 2005, whereas BS 7799-2 was adopted as 
ISO/IEC 27001 . This is the fundamental rule of all ISO/IEC 27000 
standards, which in the number ranges 27,000–27,019 and 
27,030–27,044 provide the security information management 
framework that underpins national or corporate adaptations, and 
different risk analysis and management methodologies for IS, 
respectively. Currently, both the ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO IEC 
27002 are under review, and a n e w versions are expected to be 
published in 2013. 
Quality management systems have traditionally used the plan-
do-check-act cycle or continuous improvement model, which many 
international methodologies based on the ISO/IEC 27000 series 
have also tended to adopt. This model establishes a system of indi-
cators and metrics that are comparable over t ime to quantify the 
organizational improvement progress and suggests a three-stage 
risk analysis and management methodology, see Fig. 1. 
The planning stage establishes the necessary points for starting 
u p the project, defines objectives, and identifies participants and 
competencies. Risk analysis is the central part of SIMS and is 
included in the plan phase of the continuous improvement model. 
The purpose of risk identification is to determine the potential 
losses (impacts) that could occur in the organization if the threats 
to the IS components materialize, identifying such components 
(assets), as well as their relations (dependencies), the potential 
threats and their frequency and asset degradation levels. Finally, 
the risk management stage determines t he safeguards and s t ra te-
gies that reduce impact and risk. 
The ISO/IEC 27000 [12,13] stipulations are adapted by each 
country leading to different methodologies, such as MAGERIT 
[16] (Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas, Spain), MEHARI 
[17] (Club de la Securit de l’Information Francais, France), CRAMM 
[8] (Central Computing and Telecommunications Agency, UK), 
OCTAVE and OCTAVE-S [1] (Carnegie Mellon University, USA) or 
NIST 800-30 [21] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
USA). 
In Spain, the Consejo Superior de Administración Electrónica 
(Council for Electronic Administration) established the MAGERIT 
methodology (Methodology Analysis and Risk Management Infor-
mation Systems) wi th the a im of deploying a common framework 
for risk analysis and management in IS on the basis of ISO/IEC 
27000 standards. This methodology includes t he following 
milestones: 
1. Identification and valuation of assets 
An asset is anything that is of value to the organization and 
therefore requires protection. A few data, information or 
business process assets often account for a total value of an 
organization’s assets. These assets are called terminal assets . 
Other assets (support assets such as hardware, software, person-
nel, and facilities) are valuable insofar as they are beneficial to 
the terminal assets, and they inherit the terminal asset value, 
according to the resulting benefit. Thus, support assets have 
no intrinsic value; they take their value from terminal assets. 
The identified assets of the organization are then valued. Some 
assets may have a monetary value (how much money the 
organization would lose if this asset s topped working), whereas 
others require a qualitative assessment (if an asset stops 
working the losses would be very high, low, medium, etc.). 
Fig. 1. Risk analysis and management in information systems. 
As mentioned above, the support assets inherit their values 
from terminal assets depending on how they influence each 
other. So, w e have to determine the dependency relationships 
of the terminal assets wi th respect to support assets, and also 
dependency relationships between support assets. 
2 . Threat identification 
A threat is an event that can trigger an incident in the organiza-
tion, causing damage or intangible material loss to assets. A 
threat may be of natural or human, accidental or deliberate ori-
gin. Some threats can affect more than one asset. In such cases, 
threats can cause different impacts depending on what assets 
are affected. A detailed list of threats is available in Annex C 
of ISO IEC 27005. MAGERIT suggests two threat assessment 
measures : degradation, the damage that the threat can cause 
to the asset, and frequency, how often the threat materializes. 
3 . Identification and valuation of impact and risk indicators 
It is then necessary to qualitatively identify the consequences 
and establish impact and risk indicators for the valued assets 
and threats . The impact of a threat on an asset is the product 
of the asset value multiplied by the respective degradation. Risk 
is the product of the impact of the threat multiplied by the 
respective frequency. 
4. Selection of safeguards 
Safeguards are measures for addressing threats . They can be 
procedures, personnel policies, technical solutions or physical 
security measures at the facilities. These safeguards can be pre-
ventive, if they reduce the frequency of threats ; or palliative, if 
they reduce the degradation of assets caused by threats [16]. 
The MAGERIT methodology provides two computational mod-
els : a quantitative model and an ordinal symbolic (qualitative) 
model. The quantitative model states precise values within the 
range [0,1] in order to measure magnitudes, whereas the qualita-
tive model establishes an ordinal scale. In neither case is vague 
or imprecise information about the input parameters allowed. In 
our opinion, this is an important drawback of the methodology. 
Moreover, additional advantages could be gained using a classical 
fuzzy linguistic computational rather than the ordinal symbolic 
computational model provided by MAGERIT. 
In this paper, w e propose an extension of t he methodology pro-
posed by Vicente et al. [24], to adapt the MAGERIT methodology for 
risk analysis in IS to account for vague or imprecise information 
about t he input parameters on the basis of classical fuzzy linguistic 
computational models. A fuzzy linguistic t e rm scale is constructed 
to valuate the different risk analysis elements, the ari thmetic pro-
posed by Xu et al. [32] based on trapezoidal fuzzy numbers is used 
to make computat ions and, finally, a similarity function is used to 
translate the resulting trapezoidal fuzzy numbers into a linguistic 
t e rm on the previously defined scale. 
In Section 2, w e briefly introduce fuzzy computational models 
and describe the computational models included in the MAGERIT 
methodology and its drawbacks. Consequently, w e have decided 
to extend the MAGERIT computational model to solve these prob-
lems. Section 3 introduces the fuzzy extension of the MAGERIT 
methodology. First, w e review some operations on trapezoidal 
fuzzy numbers and introduce a fuzzy evaluation of asset depen-
dencies. Second, w e provide a fuzzy five-component valuation of 
assets. Threats and asset risk impact indicators are then described. 
Then, w e introduce t he similarity function used to associate a 
linguistic t e rm from the previously defined set wi th t he resulting 
trapezoidal fuzzy numbers . Finally, w e tackle the selection of 
preventive safeguards to address threats . The methodology is illus-
trated in Section 4 using an example concerning an administration 
unit tha t uses its in-house and third-party ISs for internal opera-
tions and to provide public information services. Finally, some 
conclusions and future research are discussed in Section 5. 
2. Fuzzy computational models and the MAGERIT methodology 
Fuzzy logic introduced by Zadeh in 1965 [33] is a mathematical 
tool for modeling concepts using vague or imprecise measure-
ments. This tool is especially interesting in computational models 
where experts are unable to give specific values to certain vari-
ables. Instead, it assigns linguistic terms of a previously defined 
scale from a total order. 
For example, C = {l0 ~ VeryLow, l1 ss Low, l2 « Medium, l3 ~ 
High, l4 ~ VeryHigh} is a five-term linguistic scale in which we 
can imprecisely measure a given magnitude. The linguistic term 
scale must satisfy the following properties [10]: 
1. There is a negation operator Neg(li) = lj such that j = n - i, 
where n is the cardinality of the linguistic scale. 
2. There exists a total order li sg lj <^> i sg j . 
These linguistic terms can be represented by functions 
fi •. 35 —> [0,1] to indicate the degree of membership of the value 
x e 35 to the corresponding linguistic term. This membership func-
tion is usually triangular, trapezoidal or Gaussian. For example, a 
normalized trapezoidal fuzzy number, which can be denoted by 
A = {a1,a2,a3,a4), has a membership function (see Fig. 2) 
/eA x = 
a 2 ^
1
 if a1 < x < a2 
1 if a2 6 x 6 a3 
a3-^
4
 if a3 < x < a4 
0 otherwise 
(1) 
Two linguistic computational models can be used within fuzzy 
logic: 
1. The classical linguistic computational model defines a fuzzy num-
ber arithmetic using operations with membership functions, as 
an extension of real arithmetic. These arithmetic operations on 
fuzzy numbers result in a new fuzzy number, which generally 
does not necessarily belong to the previously defined linguistic 
scale. Then, similarity measures of fuzzy numbers are used to 
decide which element on the scale is associated with the result 
of these operations. For examples of the classical linguistic com-
putational model, see [31,4,6,27]. 
2. Ordinal symbolic computational models do not use membership 
functions, but identifies the given scale with an interval of 
length n - 1, where n is the cardinality of the linguistic scale, 
and make computations between linguistic terms whose results 
are real numbers in the associated interval: 
cp •. {l0,.. .,ln_1}^^[0,n - 1], lii—><p(li) = i. 
For example, {l0,... ,l4} ~ [0,4] c 35. Commonly used operators 
are the convex combination [10] (like the arithmetic or weighted 
average), minimum, maximum or the ordered weighted 
aggregation (OWA), among others. As in the classical model, 
the real results of the operators may not belong to the linguistic 
scale, but one of the linguistic terms is associated with the result 
using an approximation function. 
The 2-tuple model [10] is an ordinal symbolic computational 
model designed to resolve the problem of discretizing the opera-
tion space on the linguistic term scale. The results of symbolic 
operations performed on the scale C = {l0,..., ln_1} ~ [0,n - 1] 
are given by tuple (li, a), where li is the linguistic term closest to 
the result and a e [-0.5,0.5) represents the distance to the term. 
For example, if an operation on the symbolic scale {l0,... ,l4} out-
puts the value 3.25, then that value is the tuple (l3,0.25). 
Then, we obtain the function 
D: [ 0 , n - 1 ] - > £ x [-0.5,0.5), 0h->D(0) = (li,a), 
with i = round(fl), the rounding operator, and a = /? - i. 
It is verified that D is bijective, and its inverse is D-1 (li, a) = i + a . 
This guarantees the preservation of information, however the 
2-tuple method does not allow non-linear operators. Three lin-
ear operators are introduced in [10]: the arithmetic mean, the 
weighted average and the OWA operator, but it is not possible 
to multiply two linguistic terms in the 2-tuple symbolic model. 
The virtual language model [31] or the 2-tuples proportional 
model [27] propose other operators for the 2-tuple model, but 
they do not include the product of linguistic terms. 
Different applications of the 2-tuple model have been reported in 
the literature, such as [19] for multi-attribute decision-making 
under risk, [20] for security evaluation in computer networks, 
[20] in the educational field, [26] in market research or [2] in 
data mining. Two applications of the 2-tuple model to group deci-
sion-making can be found in [29,30]. 
There is a loss of information in both the classical and the sym-
bolic models as a result of the approach to be performed either by 
the similarity function in the classical model or by using the 
approximation function in the symbolic model. 
The MAGERIT methodology provides two computational mod-
els: a quantitative model and an ordinal symbolic (qualitative) 
model. 
Quantitative model. This model directly measures each magni-
tude in the range [0,1] so that the minimum value corresponds 
to zero and the maximum to one. The main drawback of this model 
is that experts may find it difficult to assign precise values to the 
input parameters of the model, and the results are sensitive to 
these values. 
Qualitative model. The ordinal symbolic model establishes an 
ordinal scale 
<p 
V = {0,..., f n - 1 }~[0 ,n- 1]. 
The different risk magnitudes are measured on this scale, where 
V0 is a term under which the magnitude is considered negligible. 
The operators considered in this qualitative model are: 
Fig. 2. Membership function. 
1. max and min operators. 
2. product by scalars in [0,1], which can represent magnitudes such 
as the degradation associated with the materialization of a 
threat on an asset or the potential reduction of the impact of 
the threat thanks to a safeguard. For example, if a certain safe-
guard reduces impact vi by a%, then this impact is reduced to a 
level 
p=v
 ix (1 -100)^q>(Vi) x ( 1 - 1 0 0 ) = i x ( 1 - 1 0 0 ) e [0 ,n-1] . 
As mentioned above, the result will not necessarily be a linguis-
tic term on the given scale. In the MAGERIT methodology, a linguis-
tic scale term is assigned to the result of these operators by 
rounding. This is computed in the example above as 
4>: [ 0 , n - 1] —> {v 0, . . . , f„_1}, 
<£(/?) = round(fl) = roundli x (1 - 100 j j e [0, n - 1] n N 
= {V0,...,Vn-1}. 
For example, using the scale I>0,...,V4, let us assume that a 
threat implies an impact value v3 on an information asset and that 
the frequency of the threat is 0.4. Then, MAGERIT computes the 
risk associated with this threat on the asset as 0.4 x f3R±0.4x 
(p{v
 3) = 0.4 x 3 = 1.2 and 4>{1.2) = t1. 
This computational model has several drawbacks: 
1. Some magnitudes, such as the degradation or the frequency of a 
threat, have to be assessed by means of precise percentages. 
Some operations, such as the product or the sum of linguistic 
terms, whose results may be outside the interval [0,n - 1], are 
prohibited. This may have unrealistic consequences for risk 
analysis. For example, if a threat has a very high impact, f4, 
and a frequency of 0.5, then the risk implied by this threat is 
v2 (medium), but, with this impact and frequency a risk is per-
ceived to be very high. 
The problem is that a probability 0.5 is perceived as high in 
many real-life activities, particularly for activities that appear 
to be most important and have a major impact on our lives. 
Thus, it is not advisable to use the product by probabilities 
viewed as real numbers [0,1], as MAGERIT does. 
2. A lot of information is lost through the rounding. Note that the 
function cp is not bijective. 
3. Terms such as 0.5 x v
 3 = 1.5 are somewhat ambiguous. We do 
not know whether this value should be assigned to t>1 or v2. 
4. It does not take advantage of the properties associated with the 
membership function used in the classical model. 
5. It needs symmetric and uniformly distributed linguistic terms 
scales. 
Consequently, we have decided to extend the MAGERIT compu-
tational model from the classical linguistic fuzzy model perspec-
tive since it seems the better choice because it enables to model 
magnitudes using vague or imprecise measurements and because 
of the properties associated with the use of membership functions 
as well as because of drawbacks associated with ordinal symbolic 
computational models 
Note that classical linguistic fuzzy models also result in a loss of 
information caused by the procedure enacted by the similarity 
function. However, the similarity function will not be applied until 
the end of the risk analysis of the IS, when a linguistic term is asso-
ciated with the derived risk or impact fuzzy value, if required by 
the experts. In other words, unlike the ordinal symbolic model pro-
vided by MAGERIT, where the rounding operation is performed 
after each computation, the trapezoidal fuzzy numbers output in 
the different computations (indirect dependences, etc.) will be 
propagated throughout the risk analysis stages in the risk analysis 
that we propose. Moreover, the similarity function is not used to 
select preventive safeguards. This constitutes a minor loss of infor-
mation and, consequently, another advantage of the fuzzy exten-
sion that we propose. 
3. Fuzzy extension of MAGERIT methodology 
Let us consider the set of normalized trapezoidal fuzzy numbers 
with support in [0,1],IF[0,1], i.e. A = (a,b,c,d), with 0 < a < b < 
csgdsg1, together with a membership function /x~(x), see (1) 
and Fig. 2. 
We use the following arithmetic proposed in [32] in IF[0,1]: If 
A1 = (a1,i>1,C1,d1) and A2 = (a2,b2,C2,d2), then 
A1 ©A2 = (a1 +a2-a1a2,b1 +b2 -b1b2,C1 + c2-C1C2,d1 + d2-d1d2), 
A1 ®A2 = (a1a2,b1b2,C1C2,d1d2). 
Both operations (© and <g>) are well defined. © and <g> are two 
internal composition laws in IF[0,1] that verify commutative and 
associative properties and have a neutral element. 
3.1. Fuzzy valuation of dependencies 
As cited in the introduction, the assets in IS are connected by 
dependency relationships, and a failure of one asset may affect 
other assets, forming an acyclic graph, as shown in Fig. 3. 
Asset Aj depends on the asset A, (or A, influences A,), denoted by 
(Aj,Aj) (graphically A, —> A,), if a failure in asset A, causes a failure in 
the asset A, with any given probability. This probability is usually 
referred to as the degree of dependency of A, with respect to A, or 
the influence of A, over A,, which we denote by dd(Aj,A,). 
Proposed IS risk analysis methodologies assign just a percent-
age to indicate the degree of dependency between two assets, 
and sometimes even propose the use of a Boolean value indicating 
whether or not this dependency exists regardless of the degree of 
dependency, see [16,17,8,1,21]. We propose the use of trapezoidal 
fuzzy numbers to represent these dependencies. Consequently, 
dd(Aj,A,) e TF[0,1] and the experts can build a linguistic term set 
to intuitively define the dependency between two assets under 
uncertainty. 
The dependency between assets in the dependency structure 
need not be direct but can be transitive. Namely, if (Aj,A,) and 
(AjjAj;), then (Aj,A )^. 
Fig. 3 . Asset dependencies structure in information systems. 
Our aim then is to compute the indirect asset dependencies 
since assets values are accumulated from terminal assets through 
these dependencies. 
The degree of dependency of asset A with respect to A, 
DD{Ai,Ak), is computed as follows.1 We denote by P = {P1;... ,PS} 
the set of paths in the analysis of the influence of A over Ak. These 
paths are a sequence of consecutive arcs in the acyclic graph con-
necting the corresponding vertices A and Ak. Then, 
(A) If all assets (excluding A, and A) in the paths in P are influ-
enced by only one asset, then 
P4 and P3 i 5 . 
DD(A,,Ak) © DD(At,Ak\Pj), 
where DD(A 
where P, : (A 
Ak\Pj) = dd(At,Aj1) ® dd(Aj1,Aj2) ® . . . ® dd(A„A), 
A A A A). 
(B) Otherwise, we assume that the first r paths in P are formed 
by assets (excluding A and A) influenced by only one asset, 
and the remaining s-r paths include at least one asset 
influenced by two or more assets. Then, for the r first paths, 
we proceed as in A), and we denote by S the set including the 
s-r remaining paths. We proceed with S as follows: 
(i) Compute the set of non-terminal assets in S influenced 
by two or more assets, denoted by /, and the subset of / 
including assets uninfluenced by any other asset in /, 
denoted by M. 
(ii) We consider an asset A in M. Then, we simplify the paths 
inS that include asset A making A —>A —> • • • —>A, with 
dd(A,A) = £>D(A,A) (computed as in A)). 
(iii) Remove repeated paths from S and keep only one 
instance. 
(iv) Build / and M again from S. 
(v) If M is not empty, go to (ii). Otherwise, the algorithm 
finishes. 
Let us denote the resulting set of paths by S= {P\,... ,P'm}, with 
m sg s -r. Then, the degree of dependency of A regarding A is 
DD(A,A) = ®DD(Ai,Ak\Pj)®DD(Ai,Ak\P'1). j=1 1=1 
Fig. 3 shows two examples of possible dependency structures in 
IS. In the first example, P = {P1 : (A —> A2 —> A4),P2 : (A —> 
A —»A4)}, all the assets (excluding A and A4) are influenced by 
one asset. Then, we apply A) again leading to 
DD(A A ) = DD(A,A4|P1) eDD(A,A4|P2) 
= [dd(A A ) ffi dd(A2,A4)] ffi [dd(A,A3) ® dd(A A ) ] -
In the second example, 
P = {P1 : (A —> A2 ^A5),P2 •. (A —> A2 —> A ^ A5), 
P3 : (A —> A2 —* A3 —* A4 —> A5),P4 : (A —* A3 —*A5), 
P5 : (A —> A —*A4 —*A5),P6 • (A —> A4 —*A5)}, 
asset A is influenced by A1 and A, and A is influenced by A1 and A . 
Therefore, we apply B) with r = 1 and S = {P2,P3,P4,P5,P6} and 
proceed as follows: 
(iii) S = {P'2,P3,P6 since P2 
(iv) / = {A} and NI = {A}. 
(v) Go to (ii). 
(ii) We select A4, then we simplify the paths P'3 and P6 to 
P3': (A ^ A ^ A ) , _ a n d P'6 •. {A1^ A —»A ^ respectively, 
with dd(A A ) = DD(A1 ,A4) = (dd(A A ) <S> dd(A3,A4)) © dd 
(AA). 
(iii) S = {P'2,P3} since P"3 = P'6. 
(iv) / = empty and M = empty. 
(v) The algorithm finishes since M = empty. 
Finally, S = {P'2,P3} and the degree of dependency of A regard-
ing A1 is 
D D ( A A ) = DD(A1,A5\P1) © DD(A1,A5\P'2) © DD(AA|P3 ') 
= {dd(A1,A2)®dd(A2,A5)^ 
© (dd(A1,A) <8> dd(A A ) ) 
© (dd{A1,A4) © ddA)^5))-
Note that transactions between trapezoidal fuzzy numbers rep-
resenting linguistic terms from a set in [0,1] will remain in TF[0,1], 
and the results of these operations can be translated into one of the 
linguistic terms of the set by means of a similarity function. Fur-
thermore, the operation © is consistent with the methodologies 
established for risk analysis and management in IS, allowing per-
formances in probabilistic terms. 
Let us consider these issues in more detail. The MAGERIT [16] 
methodology uses crisp probabilities to determine the depen-
dency, as mentioned before, and proposes the following operation: 
affib = a + b - ab. 
Operation © is a special case of the operation proposed in [32] 
and used in this paper, ©, since a crisp probability a e [0,1] can 
be written as the trapezoidal fuzzy number 
a ©fa = (a, a, a, a) © {b, b, b, b) 
= (a + b - ab,a + b - ab,a + b - ab,a + b - ab) = a©b 
~ affib. 
Operation ® extends naturally to the product of real numbers. 
Therefore, by defining operations © and (g>, we have successfully 
extended the basic operations using IS risk analysis and manage-
ment methodologies to the context of fuzzy numbers. 
As an example, let us consider the first dependency structure in 
Fig. 3 and the linguistic term set in Table 1 and Fig. 4. Note that 
other linguistic terms scales could be used, with a different number 
of terms or with different membership functions (triangular, non-
symmetrical, etc.) instead of the trapezoidal. A solution for possible 
conflicts in the valuations in a group decision-making context is an 
interesting future research line. Moreover, if the expert is not 
confident with a predetermined scale, he/she could also use a 
method for extracting a fuzzy number representing a probabilistic 
(i) / = {A A } and M = {A}. 
(ii) We select A , then we simplify the paths P2, P3,P4 and P5 to 
P2 : (A —>A3 —> A), P'3 
A3 —> A ) and P5 •. (A —s 
—> A3 —> A4 —> A) , P'4 : (A —> 
A ^ A ) , respectively, with 
dd (A,A) = 55(A A ) = (dd (A,A) ® dd (A,A)) © dd(A A ) . 
• (A 
A 
1
 To avoid ambiguity (see Fig. 3), we will write ‘‘DD’’ to refer to total dependency 
between two assets separated by other intermediate assets, and ‘‘dd’’ when they are 
directly connected. 
Table 1 
Fuzzy linguistic term set. 
Term Fuzzy number 
Very low (VL) 
Low (L) 
Medium–low (M–L) 
Medium (M) 
Medium–high (M–H) 
High (H) 
Very high (VH) 
(0,0,0,0.05) 
(0,0.05,0.15,0.25) 
(0.15,0.25,0.35,0.45) 
(0.35,0.45,0.55,0.65) 
(0.55,0.65,0.75,0.85) 
(0.75,0.85,0.95,1) 
(0.95,1,1,1) 
Fig. 4. A seven-member linguistic term set. 
judgment for each event, such as the one based on bettings and lot-
teries proposed in [25], which accounts for a group context, 
because individual conflicting views or judgments can be captured 
through imprecise responses. 
On the other hand, experts have assigned the influences shown 
in Table 2. Then, the degree of dependency of A1 with respect to A4 
is 
DD(A1,A4) = \dd(A1,A2) ® dd(A2,A4)\ © \dd(A1,A3) ® dd(A3,A4)\ 
= [H®M]ffi[M—H<g>M] = (0.404,0.563,0.719,0.843). 
3.2. Fuzzy valuation of assets 
MAGERIT defines the value of an asset as the losses that would 
be sustained if the respective asset is no longer available. These 
can be losses of money, user confidence, the organizational 
prestige, etc. Assets are usually evaluated taking into account the 
following five components [16]: 
• Confidentiality. How much damage would it cause if the asset is 
disclosed to someone it should not be? This is a typical data 
inspection. 
• Integrity. How much damage would it cause if the asset is dam-
aged or corrupt? This is a typical data inspection. Data can be 
manipulated, be wholly or partially false, or even missing. 
• Authenticity. How much damage would it cause if we do not 
exactly know who has done what? This is a typical services 
(user authentication) and data (authenticity of the person 
accessing data to write or read) inspection. 
• Traceability. How much damage would it cause if it is not known 
for whom the service is being provided?, i.e. who does what and 
when? How much damage would it cause if it is not known who 
accessed what data and what they did with them? 
• Availability. How much damage would it cause if the asset is not 
available or cannot be used? This is a typical services 
inspection. 
Only the terminal assets have an associated value for the above 
components. The other assets accumulate value from terminal 
assets on the basis of dependency relationships. We again use 
the set of linguistic terms that represent trapezoidal fuzzy num-
bers to represent uncertainty when valuating the terminal assets. 
Let us denote assets by Vj = (Vj1,Vj2,Vj3,Vj4,Vj{5)), where 
Djm is a linguistic term assigned by an expert for the rth value com-
ponent in asset Aj. If we denote by TAS the terminal asset set, then 
the value of asset Aj with respect to terminal assets is: 
Table 2 
Fuzzy degrees of dependency. 
Influence 
A1 —»A2 
A2 —»A4 
A1 —»A3 
A3 —»A4 
Term 
High 
Medium 
Medium-High 
Medium 
Fuzzy number 
(0.75,0.85,0.95,1) 
(0.35,0.45,0.55,0.65) 
(0.55,0.65,0.75,0.85) 
(0.35,0.45,0.55,0.65) 
%=£WD D(4A)®%)- (2) 
Note that the sums in the above expression are computed as fol-
lows: A1 + A2 = (<31 +a2,b1 +b2,C1 +c2,d1 +d2). 
3.3. Threats 
A threat is an event that can trigger an incident in our organiza-
tion, causing damage or intangible material loss to the assets, and 
an attack is any deliberate action aimed at violating the IS security 
mechanisms. 
Once assets have been valuated, the next step in the risk analy-
sis methodology is to assess threats and estimate indicators of the 
impact on and risk to assets. MAGERIT suggests two threat assess-
ment measures: degradation, the damage that the threat can cause 
to the asset; and frequency, how often the threat materializes. 
We will again use fuzzy linguistic terms rather than percent-
ages and probabilities to represent degradation and frequency. A 
threat is a vector T = (D,f) whose components are degradation 
and frequency. A degradation has to be established for each of 
the five asset components described in the Section 3. 
Let us consider a threat on asset Aj whose degradation in each 
component is given by the vector 
D = (d 1,d 2,d
 3 , d 4,d 5 ) , 
i.e., the threat T causes a degradation d, in the !th component of the 
asset. 
When the threat is realized, each component is affected by the 
expression 
where /,- is the impact on the rth component of the attacked asset 
(Aj). 
We use (3) below to compute the risk to the asset 
%)=X(i)®7- (3) 
After computing the impact caused by a materialized threat on 
an asset, we can compute the impact transmitted from the 
attacked asset to its dependent assets. If A, is the asset on which 
the threat has materialized and the degree of dependency of Aj 
with respect to Ak is DD(Ak,Aj), then the attack on asset Aj has an 
impact on Ak of Ik = DD(Ak,Aj) <g> d, <g> Vj . Thus, the risk to asset 
Ak is 
Rklfi =h{!) ®J = DD(Ak,Aj) <8) d, <8) Vj{!) ®J. 
3.4. Similarity function 
A similarity function is required to associate the resulting trape-
zoidal fuzzy number with an element in the linguistic term set. 
This function can also be used at any step of the methodology to 
derive the linguistic terms associated with the respective trapezoi-
dal fuzzy numbers output to represent dependencies, accumulated 
values, etc. 
Several authors have proposed different similarity functions, 
which are based on the centroid of a fuzzy number and the dis-
tance between the components of the fuzzy numbers in TF[0,1], 
[4,15,11,5,6,28,9]. A similarity function was proposed and 30 sets 
of linguistic value trapezoidal fuzzy numbers were used to 
compare the calculation results with other previously proposed 
functions in [7]. Finally, a more recent similarity function was pro-
posed in [32] and compared with the proposal reported in [7]. 
However, the above similarity functions are unsuitable for use 
in TF[0,1]. We use the function proposed in [22,23], which consid-
ers another parameter consisting of the ratio between the common 
area and the joint area under the membership functions of trape-
zoidal fuzzy numbers [22,23]. 
Given A = (a1,a2,a3,a4) and B = {b1,b2,b3,b4) eTF[0,1], the 
similarity function can be defined as 
if max{(a4 - a1), {b4 - b1)}^0, then 
S(A, B) = 1 - (1 - a - /J) x 1 - 0 ^ n l ^ | 
J0 ^ j W a x J 
V) a,- - bA „ A' A' B' B 
V- P T 7 4 M 
• otherwise, 
S(A,B) = 1 1 - (X a Ela.'-b.'l 2 4 
M 
where a + ji < 1, \i~ is the membership function of %, 
M = max {d((x,y),(x',y'))}, 
[0,1] x 0 1 2 
u—(x) = min{u~(x), «~(x)j, 
r AnB v ' 0 < « 1 L r A v ; " B V '" 
U~ ~(X) 
r
 AuBv ' 
max{u~(x), «~(x)j, 
(X~, Y~), (X~, Y~) are the centroids of A and B, respectively, and d is 
a distance in 9l2. 
The use of this similarity measure is justified in [22,23]. Suffice 
is to say that S(A,B) e [0,1], S(A,B) =S(B,A), S(A,B) = 1 if and 
only if A = B, and S(/1,B) = 0 if and only if A = (0,0,0,0) and 
B = (1,1,1,1). 
Looking at the first example in Fig. 3, the degree of dependency 
ofA4 with respect toA1 was computed in Section 2, leading to the 
trapezoidal fuzzy number (0.404,0.563,0.719,0.843), see Fig. 5. 
Applying the similarity function with equal weights for all three 
components the degree of dependency of A4 with respect to A1 is 
Medium-High (similarity 0.8081). 
3.5. Preventive safeguards 
Safeguards are measures for addressing threats. They can be 
procedures, such as incident management and documentation, 
personnel policies, technical solutions, or physical security mea-
sures at the facilities. 
These safeguards can be preventive, if they reduce the frequency 
of threats; or palliative, if they reduce the degradation of assets 
caused by threats [16]. As the degree of dependency between 
two assets is the failure transmission probability, a special type 
of preventive safeguard is one that reduces dependencies between 
support and terminal assets. 
The effect induced by a safeguard on the failure transmission 
probability between two assets Au and Av can also be defined as 
a linguistic term, which is represented by a fuzzy number 
e e TF[0,1]. So if the degree of direct dependency between the 
assets Au and Av is dd{Au,Av), then, when we implement a safe-
guard with effect e, the degree of direct dependency is reduced to 
dd{Au,Av) s (T e e ) , 
where e denotes the usual subtraction operation between trapezoi-
dal fuzzy numbers, i.e., {a1,a2,a3,a4) e (b1,b2,b3,b4) = (a1 - b4, 
a2 — f?3,fl3 — b2,a4 — b1). 
We consider the set of safeguards that block direct failure trans-
mission between Au and Av,SU,v. Each safeguard Sufv e Su,v has a 
monetary cost c^v and an effect e^v on dd{Au,Av). 
The problem of keeping the failure transmission probabilities 
among support and terminal assets at an acceptable level with 
minimal costs can be represented as: 
min 
s.t. 
cup ; v x u p ; v 
(4) 
DD(A{,A]i) ^ Ufa Vi, k 
x
u/ e {0,1 }W,v,p, 
where i and k in the first set of constraints refer to non-terminal and 
terminal assets, respectively, Uik is a residual value accepted by the 
experts, xjj>v are the decision variables (xjj>v = 1 means that safe-
guard SUp v is selected), and DD{At,Ak) is reassessed replacing values 
dd{Au,Av) by the affected values regarding the selected safeguards: 
dd{Au,Av) ig, <8)(1 
p 
Fig. 5. Fuzzy number (0.404,0.563,0.719, 0.843). 
where Au and Av are two consecutive assets connected by an arc in 
some path between At and Ak. 
Note that the fact that the usual order in TF[0,1] is a partial 
order constitutes a very restrictive constraint in our optimization 
problem, so we will use the similarity function, S, introduced in 
the previous section, to relax this constraint. ^ ^ 
If we define a threshold a e [0,1], the constraint DD{Ai,Ak) sg 
Uik \/i,k can be replaced by S{DD{At,Ak), Uik) P a in (4). Thus, the 
restrictiveness of the constraint increases proportionally to the 
threshold value and the feasible solution set will be composed of 
solutions that verify these softened/relaxed constraints. 
Remember that indirect dependencies are recursively com-
puted following the algorithm described in Section 3.1. Thus, the 
degree of dependency of the support assets further away from 
the terminals can be computed from the degree of dependency of 
the closest assets. Therefore, the problem can be solved in a stage-
wise manner, and observes the principle of optimality as required in 
dynamic programming: given an optimal sequence of decisions, 
every subsequence is, in turn, optimal. Then, we proceed as 
follows: 
• Let L0 be the set of terminal assets. Identify safeguards that 
minimize costs keeping the degrees of dependency between 
assets in L0 at an acceptable level. 
• Consider L1 including support assets whose children belong 
to L0 only. Identify safeguards that minimize costs keeping 
the degrees of dependency on their children at an accept-
able level. 
• Consider L2 including support assets whose children belong 
to L0 u L1 only. Identify safeguards that minimize costs 
keeping the degrees of dependency over L0 under an 
acceptable level. Note that the degrees of indirect depen-
dency from the children of L2 to terminal assets have 
already been computed in the previous stage, so we just 
need to identify the direct degree of dependency on assets 
in L0 u L1. 
• Consider Li including support assets whose children belong 
to L0 U L1 U ... U Li_1 only. Identify safeguards that minimize 
costs keeping the degrees of dependency on L0 under an 
acceptable level. Note that again we just need to identify 
the direct degree of dependency on assets of L0 u . . . u Li_1. 
Simulated annealing (SA) [14,3] is applied in each step of the 
algorithm to derive the optimal selection of safeguards from opti-
mization problems in (4). 
The basic idea of SA is as follows. An initial feasible solution is 
randomly generated. In each iteration a new solution is randomly 
generated from the neighborhood of the current solution. If the 
new solution is better than the current one, then the algorithm 
moves to that solution, otherwise there is some probability of a 
movement to the new solution. Accepting worse solutions allows 
for a more extensive search for the optimal solution and avoids 
trapping in local optima in early iterations. 
The probability of accepting a worse movement is a function of 
both a temperature factor (t) and the change in the cost function. 
The initial value of t is high, which leads to a diversified search, 
since practically all movements are allowed. As t decreases, the 
probability of accepting a worse movement falls. If t is zero, then 
only better movements will be accepted, which makes SA work like 
hill climbing. 
4. An illustrative example 
We consider an administrative unit that uses in-house and 
third-party information systems internally to provide public 
information services (electronic government) [16]. Alarmed by 
potential security threats existing in the internet and taking into 
account that a service failure would cause serious damage to the 
unit’s operation and prestige, a risk analysis and management pro-
ject was launched. 
The project scope was confined to the personal and remote elec-
tronic processing service, as well as the security of the information 
handled. With regard to the equipment, both machine and com-
munications networks were analysed. 
The service was provided by a computer database application 
accessed via a local user identification that controls access privi-
leges. The processing includes a request (and data entry) phase 
and a response (and data delivery) phase. Users make their request 
and await a notification to collect the reply. The notification was 
sent by registered mail in the case of personal processing, and by 
email in the case of remote processing. 
A centralised archive and document recovery service was pro-
vided by an intranet. Users accessed it through a local Web inter-
face that connects via a private virtual network with a remote 
server, with users identified by their identity card number. This 
service was only available to the unit personnel and to the virtual 
employee who provides the remote formality service. 
The unit had various PCs on its premises. The equipment had no 
removable media of any type: diskette, CD, DVD, USB, etc., and a 
medium-sized, general-purpose server was available as file, elec-
tronic mail, database and web server. 
A local area network was available with an ADSL internet con-
nection via a firewall that limited the communication. Remote pro-
cessing, e-mail, information access and a private virtual network 
with the central archive services were provided via the internet 
connection. 
A risk analysis stage revealed t he assets and the asset dependen-
cies shown in Fig. 6. A more detailed description of this stage is 
provided in [16], where t he MAGERIT methodology is used to ana-
lyse the problem. Therefore, Boolean values were originally used to 
indicate whether or not any dependencies existed regardless of the 
degree of dependency. The computations were m a d e using PILAR 
[18] software that implements t he MAGERIT methodology. 
The following 1 1 assets were considered: processing in person 
(presential-proc), remote processing (remote-proc), current files 
(current-f), e-mail (mail), central historical archive (archive), pro-
cessing of files (files-proc), work stations (wrk-stat), server (server), 
firewall (firewall), local network (LAN), and internet connection 
(internet). Note that three out of the eight assets were terminal : 
current files, processing in person and remote processing. 
Following the methodology proposed in this paper, we first con-
sider the set of linguistic te rms wi th their respective trapezoidal 
fuzzy numbers shown in Table 1 and Fig. 4 . Next, experts give lin-
guistic te rms to express the influences be tween IS assets, see Fig. 6. 
Note that only two dependencies are high, (server, archive) and 
(server, current-f), while two are medium-high (internet, archive) 
and (archive, current-f). 
Then, we compute the degree of asset dependency on terminal 
assets. First, the degree of dependency for assets that directly influ-
ence terminal assets is immediate, see Table 3 . Table 4 shows com-
putat ions to derive t he firewall, internet and server dependencies 
wi th respect to the three terminal assets, whereas Table 5 shows 
the resulting dependencies of non-terminal wi th respect to the 
three terminal assets. 
Next, experts assign linguistic t e rms for each terminal asset 
component, see Table 6. Note that authenticity and traceability have 
been split into two new components in this example each, corre-
sponding to data and services, respectively. Consequently, seven 
components will be considered for each asset, tha t is, confidential-
ity (Confid.), integrity (Integr.), data authenticity (D. Aut.), service 
Fig. 6. Asset dependencies in an IS. 
Table 3 
Immediate dependency degree computation. 
files-proc 
archive 
email 
wrk-stat 
LAN 
presential-proc 
M«iL 
M-H®L 
LigiL 
M«iL 
M-L«iL 
current-f 
M 
M-H 
L 
M 
M-L 
remote-proc 
M«iM 
M - H ® M 
L«iM 
M«iM 
M-L«iM 
Table 4 
Accumulated dependencies for firewall, internet and server. 
presential-pro current-f remote-proc 
firewall 
internet 
M«iM-H«iL 
M-H®M-H«iL 
[He(H®M-H)]®L 
M®M-H 
M-H8M-H 
He(H«iM-H) 
M«iM-H«iM 
M-H ®M-H«iM 
[He(H«iM-H)]«iM 
authenticity (S. Aut.), data traceability (D. Tra.), service traceability (S. 
Tra.) and availability (Avail.). 
Accumulated values are computed for non-terminal assets by 
means of (2), see Table 7. For example, the accumulated value for 
the archive asset in each component is computed as follows: 
Varchive1 = [(M - H g> L) g> Vpresential-proc(1} + [M - H g> VcurrenH{1]\ 
+ [ (M-H®M)®* r e m o t e _ p r o c ( 1 ) ] 
= (0:302;0:422;0:562;0:722) 
Varchivel2) = [(M - H g> L) g> Vpresential-proc2 ] + [M - H g) Vcurrent-f2 ] 
+ [ (M-H®M)®z r e m o t e _ p r o c ( 2 ) ] 
= (0:192;0:292;0:412;0:552) 
Varchive7 = [(M - H g) L) g) Vpresential-proc7] + [M - H g) Vcurrent-f7] 
+ [(M-H®M)®zremote_proc(7)] 
= (0:28;0:086;0:197;0:352) 
The MAGERIT methodology originally used a 1-10 integer scale 
to valuate asset components, where 1 and 10 were the least and 
most important values, respectively. Assignment criteria are offi-
cially described in the methodology [16]. We have translated the 
above values into the fuzzy linguistic scale, yielding the values 
for the three terminal assets shown in Table 6. 
Now let us consider a threat to the archive asset with a degrada-
tion (provided by experts) D = (H, L, VL, M, M-H, VH, H). Table 7, 
shows the seven-component valuation of this asset, and the impact 
on the asset is computed by multiplying each component of the 
above vectors, see Table 8. 
Note that the similarity function can be used at any step of the 
methodology to derive the linguistic term associated with the 
trapezoidal fuzzy number output respectively representing 
accumulated dependency, values, etc. However, trapezoidal fuzzy 
numbers will be used throughout the steps of the methodology 
since the use of linguistic terms would mean a loss of information. 
Using equal weights and the infinity distance measure in the 
similarity function, see Section 3.4, then the impact on the compo-
nents the archive asset is (M, M-L, VL, L, M-L, M-L, L). 
Next, experts assigned a high frequency (H) to the threat. Risks 
were then computed using (3), which yielded the values listed in 
Table 8. Impacts and risk can then be computed for assets that 
Table 6 
Linguistic terms for components in terminal assets. 
presential-proc current-f remote-proc 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Data authenticity 
Service authenticity 
Data traceability 
Service traceability 
Availability 
M-H 
M 
M 
M-H 
M 
M 
M 
M-H 
M 
M-L 
Table 7 
Accumulated values for non-terminal assets. 
Comp. files-proc archive 
Confid. 
Integr. 
D. Aut. 
S. Aut. 
D. Tra. 
S. Tra. 
Avail. 
Confid. 
Integr. 
D. Aut. 
S. Aut. 
D. Tra. 
S. Tra. 
Avail. 
Confid. 
Integr. 
D. Aut. 
S. Aut. 
D. Tra. 
S. Tra. 
Avail. 
Confid. 
Integr. 
D. Aut. 
S. Aut. 
D. Tra. 
S. Tra. 
Avail. 
(0.192,0.292,0.412,0.552) 
(0.122,0.202,0.302,0.422) 
(0.122,0.202,0.302,0.422) 
(0.067,0.144,0.274,0.447) 
(0.122,0.202,0.302,0.422) 
(0.042,0.100,0.204,0.351) 
(0.018,0.060,0.146,0.275) 
email 
(0.0,0.032,0.112,0.212) 
(0.0,0.022,0.082,0.162) 
(0.0,0.022,0.082,0.162) 
(0.0,0.016,0.077,0.183) 
(0.0,0.022,0.082,0.162) 
(0.0,0.011,0.057,0.141 
(0.0,0.006,0.040,0.1110 
LAN 
(0.082,0.162,0.262,0.382) 
(0.052,0.112,0.192,0.292) 
(0.052,0.112,0.192,0.292) 
(0.028,0.080,0.178,0.320) 
(0.052,0.112,0.192,0.292) 
(0.018,0.055,0.131,0.249) 
(0.007,0.033,0.094,0.195) 
internet 
(0.166,0.274,0.625,0.614) 
(0.105,0.190,0.309,0.469) 
(0.105,0.190,0.309,0.469) 
(0.058,0.135,0.280,0.491) 
(0.105,0.190,0.309,0.469) 
(0.037,0.094,0.208,0.386) 
(0.015,0.056,0.149,0.303) 
(0.302,0.422,0.562,0.722) 
(0.192,0.292,0.412,0.552) 
(0.192,0.292,0.412,0.552) 
(0.105,0.207,0.367,0.565) 
(0.192,0.292,0.412,0.552) 
(0.067,0.144,0.274,0.447) 
(0.028,0.086,0.197,0.352) 
wrk-stat 
(0.192,0.292,0.412,0.552) 
(0.122,0.202,0.302,0.422) 
(0.122,0.202,0.302,0.422) 
(0.067,0.144,0.2740.447) 
(0.122,0.202,0.302,0.422) 
(0.042,0.100,0.204,0.351) 
(0.018,0.060,0.146,0.275) 
firewall 
(0.105,0.190,0.309,0.469) 
(0.067,0.131,0.226,0.359) 
(0.067,0.131,0.226,0.359) 
(0.037,0.094,0.208,0.386) 
(0.067,0.131,0.226,0.359) 
(0.023,0.065,0.154,0.302) 
(0.010,0.039,0.110,0.236) 
server 
(0.442,0.587,0.75,0.85) 
(0.281,0.406,0.55,0.65) 
(0.281,0.406,0.55,0.65) 
(0.132,0.264,0.478,0.647) 
(0.281,0.406,0.55,0.65) 
(0.084,0.183,0.360,0.516) 
(0.036,0.101,0.259,0.407) 
influence the attacked asset (archive), that is, server, firewall and 
internet, see Table 8. 
Using the similarity function the risk to archive asset in each 
component is (M, L, VL, L, M-L, M-L, L). Finally, Table 9 shows 
the linguistic terms associated with the risk to the attacked asset 
and to assets that influence the attacked asset. 
Now, we consider the set of available safeguards of failure 
transmission between support assets shown in Table 10, and the 
fuzzy threshold U = (0;0;0:05;0:1) below which the degree of 
Table 5 
Trapezoidal fuzzy numbers representing degree of dependency. 
presential-proc current-f remote-proc 
files-proc 
archive 
email 
wrk-stat 
LAN 
firewall 
internet 
(0,0.022,0.082,0.162) 
(0,0.032,0.112,0.212) 
(0,0.002,0.022,0.062) 
(0,0.022,0.082,0.162) 
(0,0.012,0.052,0.112) 
(0 0.014,0.061,0.138) 
(0,0.021,0.084,0.18) 
(0,0.046,0.147,0.25) 
(0.35,0.45,0.55,0.65) 
(0.55,0.65,0.75,0.85) 
(0,0.05,0.15,0.25) 
(0.35,0.45,0.55,0.65) 
(0.15,0.25,0.35,0.45) 
(0.192,0.292,0.412,0.552) 
(0.302,0.422,0.562,0.722) 
(0.853,0.932,0.985,1) 
(0.122,0.202,0.302,0.422) 
(0.192,0.292,0.412,0.552) 
(0,0.022,0.082,0.162) 
(0.122,0.202,0.302,0.422) 
(0.052,0.112,0.192,0.292) 
(0.067,0.131,0.226,0.359) 
(0.105,0.190,0.309,0.469) 
(0.298,0.419, 0.542,0.65) 
server 
server 
Table 8 
Impacts on and risks to archive, server, firewall and internet assets. 
Table 10 
Available safeguards. 
Comp. Impact (archive) Risk (archive) 
Confid. (0.227, 0.359,0.534,0.722) 
Integr. (0,0.015,0.062,0.138) 
D. Aut. (0,0,0,0.028) 
S. Aut. (0.037,0.093,0.202,0.367) 
D. Tra. (0.106,0.190,0.309,0.469) 
S. Tra. (0.064,0.144,0.275,0.448) 
Avail. (0.022,0.074,0.187, 0.352) 
Impact (server) 
Confid. (0.283, 0.465,0.702,0.85) 
Integr. (0,0.019,0.081,0.162) 
D. Aut. (0,0,0,0.0325) 
S. Aut. (0.040,0.111,0.259, 0.421) 
D. Tra. (0.132, 0.247,0.407,0.552) 
S. Tra. (0.068,0.171,0.355,0.516) 
Avail. (0.023,0.081,0.243, 0.407) 
Impact (firewall) 
Confid. (0.028,0.073,0.1612,0.305) 
Integr. (0,0.002,0.019,0.058) 
D. Aut. (0,0,0,0.012) 
S. Aut. (0.005,0.019,0.063,0.163) 
D. Tra. (0.013,0.038,0.094,0.198) 
S. Tra. (0.008,0.029,0.085,0.196) 
Avail. (0.003,0.015,0.058,0.154) 
Impact (internet) 
Confid. (0.069,0.152, 0.301, 0.522) 
Integr. (0,0.006,0.035,0.1) 
D. Aut. (0,0,0,0.02) 
S. Aut. (0.011,0.04,0.116,0.272) 
D. Tra. (0.032,0.080,0.174,0.339) 
S. Tra. (0.019,0.061,0.156, 0.329) 
Avail. (0.007,0.031,0.107,0.258) 
(0.170, 0.305,0.508, 0.722) 
(0,0.012, 0.059,0.138) 
(0,0,0,0.028) 
(0.028, 0.079,0.192,0.367) 
(0.079, 0.162,0.294,0.470) 
(0.048, 0.123,0.261,0.448) 
(0.016, 0.063,0.178,0.352) 
Risk (server) 
(0.212,0.396,0.667,0.85) 
(0,0.016, 0.077,0.162) 
(0,0,0,0.032) 
(0.030,0.094,0.246, 0.421) 
(0.099, 0.201,0.386,0.552) 
(0.051, 0.145,0.337,0.516) 
(0.017, 0.069,0.230, 0.407) 
Risk (firewall) 
(0.021, 0.062,0.154,0.305) 
(0,0.002,0.018,0.058) 
(0,0,0,0.012) 
(0.003,0.016,0.06,0.163) 
(0.010,0.033,0.089,0.198) 
(0.006,0.025,0.081,0.196) 
(0.002,0.013,0.055,0.154) 
Risk (internet) 
(0.051, 0.129,0.286,0.522) 
(0,0.005,0.033,0.01) 
(0,0,0,0.02) 
(0.008,0.034,0.11, 0.272) 
(0.024, 0.068,0.165,0.339) 
(0.015, 0.052,0.149,0.329) 
(0.005,0.027,0.101,0.258) 
Table 9 
Linguistic terms for risks to assets. 
Component 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Data authenticity 
Service authenticity 
Data traceability 
Service traceability 
Availability 
archive 
M 
L 
VL 
L 
M-L 
M-L 
L 
firewall 
L 
VL 
VL 
L 
L 
L 
L 
internet 
M-L 
VL 
VL 
L 
L 
L 
L 
server 
M 
L 
VL 
L 
M-L 
M-L 
L 
dependency between all assets and terminal assets will be accept-
able, and let a = 0.95. 
Dynamic programming is then executed as follows. 
Stage 0: L0 = {presential-proc (Ai), remote-proc (A2), current-/ 
(A3)}, since there are three terminal assets in the IS. We identify 
safeguards for (A3) that minimize costs keeping the degrees of 
dependency on (Ai) and (A2) at acceptable levels, S{DD{A3,Ai), 
U) P 0.95 and S{DD{A3,A2), U) P 0.95, respectively. 
Regarding asset A3, solutions are represented by the vector 
X3-1 = (x3 , 1 , . . . jXg-1), see Table 10, where x3-1 = 1 if the safeguard 
S3;1 is selected. x3;2 (x3-2, p — V"i ,xfo) 's considered for asset A2. Both 
safeguards sets are independently selected by solving the follow-
ing optimization problems: 
J , l 3 , l min Cj' Xj' + . . . + CJQXJQ min Cj-x^' + ... + c 
s.t. s.t. 
S(DD(A3,Ai), U) P 0.95 S(DD(A3,A2), U) P 0.95 
x
31
 e {0,l},p = 1, . . . ,8 x3,2 e {0,l},q = 1, . . . ,10 
The optimal solution output by using simulated annealing and 
the associated costs are x31* = (0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) and 
Asset Safeguards (Tag (Sup ;v ), effect (eup ;v ), cost (cup ;v )) 
current-f 
files-proc 
firewall 
internet 
S3'1: {(S}'\M,250),(Sf'\L,120),(S|'\L,100), (SJ1,M-L, 179), 
(S3/1,M,225),(S3'1,M-L160),(S3'1,L,100), (Sg1,M-L, 120)} 
S3'2:{(S3'2,L,100),(S3'2,M-L127),(S3'2,M,234), 
(S3'2,L180),(S3'2,L,147), 
(S3'2,L127),(S3'2,M,234),(S3'2,M,178), (S3'2,L,220), 
(S3b2,M-L,170)} 
S4'3: {(Sf'3,M-L,196),(^3,L,108),(Sj3,M,205), (Sj3,M-H,310), 
(S5'3,M,245),(S^3,L,169),(S^'3,M-L,208), (Sg'3,M,254)} 
S , r 
(Sju'b,M-H,280), 
c10,6 
5,0,6 
5,0,6 
c , , ,6 
{(S]0'6,M,234),(S20'6,M,267),(S30'6,M,215), 
S"'b: {(S 
c , , ,6 
,M-H,302),(S2I 
c , , ,6 
,M-L,129),(S3 
archive 
wrk-stat 
mail 
LAN 
M, 235), 
(Sj,'b,M,256),(Sj,'b,M,231),(S |;,'b,L,178), (S^'6,M-H,289)} 
S5'3: {(S^'3,M,207),(S^'3,L,109),(S^'3,M-H,245), (S^3,M,267), 
(S5l3,M-L,102)} 
S5'6:{(S^'6,M,238),(S^6,L134),(S|6,M-L256), 
(S;j'b,Llll),(Sfb,M,208)} 
Sb'3:{(s5'3,M,248),(Sb'3,M,224),(S^'3,M,200), 
(Sb'3,M-L,167), (Sb '3,LH0),(S[p,M-H,256)} 
S8'3:{(S^3,M,257),(S2,3,M,234),(S3'3,L,189), 
(SS/,M,236), (S5'3,M,204),(Sg'3,L,104)} 
S9'3:{(S?'3,L,110),(S^'3,L,124),(^3,M-L143), 
(S^3,M,206), (s!p,M,237),(S|?'3,L,170)} 
S7'3:{(S7'3,M,234),(S7'3,L201),(S7'3,M,245), 
(S7'3,L178), (S7'3,M,205),(S7'3,M,200)} 
X32* = (0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,0), with costs 220 and 646, respec-
tively, see Table 11. 
Stage 1: L, ={files-proc (A4), archive (A6), mail (A7), wrk-stat (A8), 
LAN (A9)}. We identify safeguards that minimize costs keeping the 
degrees of direct dependencies between assets in L, and terminal 
assets at, S(DD(Aj,Ai), U) P 0.95,S{DD{At,A2), U) P 0.95 and 
S(DD(Aj,A3), U\P 0.95, with A, e L,. ^^ 
Note that DD(A4,Ai) = dd{A4,A3) <g> DD{A3,Ai) and the value of 
DD{A3,Ai) was computed in the previous stage. Analogously, 
DD(A4,A2) = dd{A4,A3) ®DD{A3,A2), and the value of DD{A3,A2) 
was also computed in the previous stage. 
Five optimization problems have to be solved to select safe-
guards for each asset in Li. For instance, the optimization problem 
for files_proc (A4) is 
Table 11 
Optimal selection of safeguards and costs. 
Asset 
current-f 
files-proc 
archive 
mail 
wrk-stat 
LAN 
server 
firewall 
internet 
Optimal solution 
x
3
'
2
' = (0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,0) 
x
3>r = (0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) 
x
4
'
3
* = (0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0) 
x
6
'
3
* = (0,1,1,0,0,1) 
x
7>3' = (0,0,0,1,0,0) 
x
8
'
3
* = (0,1,0,1,1,0) 
y9,3* CO 0 0 1 1 1) 
x
53
* = (1,0,1,1,1) 
x
56
* = (1,0,0,0,1) 
x
106
* =(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) 
x
11
'
6
* =(0,0,0,0,0,0,0) 
Cost 
646 
220 
623 
680 
206 
674 
583 
1267 
Stage 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
0 2 
0 2 
4899 
server 
4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 
min q' X1' H h C8' X8' 
s.t. 
S(UD(A4, 
S(DD(A4, 
S(DD(A4, 
43 e {0. 
A 1), U) P 0.95 
A
 2), U) P 0.95 
A 3), U) P 0.95 
1},p = 1, . . . ,8 
Table 13 
Safeguards and costs for the new thershold. 
The optimal solution output by using simulated annealing and 
the associated costs are x4-3* = (0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0) and 623, respec-
tively, see Table 11. 
Stage 2: L2 ={server (A5), firewall (A10), internet (A11)}. Now, we 
identify safeguards that minimize costs keeping the degrees of 
direct dependencies between assets in L2 and terminal assets at 
levels obtained in Stage 1. 
The degree of dependency of the server asset (A5) on terminal 
assets can be computed by 
DD(A5,A1)= [(dd(A5,A6)®DD(A6,A3)) edd(A5,A3)] ®DD{A3,A1), 
DD{A5,A2) = [(dd(A5,A6)®DD(A6,A3)) edd(A5,A3)] ®DD(A3,A2), 
aD{A5,A3)=(dd{A5,A6)®DD{A6,A3))®dd{A5,A3), 
respectively,and DD(A3,A1) and DDA3A2) were computed in Stage 
0, whereas DD{A6A3) was computed in Stage 1. 
The corresponding optimization problem for server {A5) is 
min C1,3X1'3 + . . . + c553x553 + c516x516 + ... + d556x55'6 
s.t. 
S(DD(A5,A1), &) P 0.95 
S{DD{A5,A2), U) P 0.95 
S(DD(A5,A3), U) P 0.95 
5,3 5,6 Xp" e {0, 1},p 1 , . . . , 5, 
and the optimal solutions output using simulated annealing are 
X53* = (1,0,1,1,1) and x5-6* = (1,0,0,0,1) with a cost of 1267, see 
Table 11. 
Table 11 shows the optimal solutions representing the selection 
of safeguards for assets throughout the application of dynamic 
programming and simulated annealing and the respective costs, 
whereas Table 12 shows the degree of dependency of assets on ter-
minal assets after the implementation of the selected safeguards. 
Note that no safeguards are selected for the firewall {A10) and 
internet {A11) assets, see Table 12. The reason is that the implemen-
tation of optimal safeguards for the archive asset (A6) in Stage 1 
reduce the degree of dependency of that asset on terminal assets, 
see Table 12, row 3. Consequently, the degree of dependency of 
the firewall (A10) and internet {A11) assets, which are connected only 
to the archive asset (see Fig. 6), on terminal assets is so low at that 
point that it is unnecessary to implement any safeguards for those 
assets, and no money has to be spent. 
Table 12 
Degree of dependencies after the implementation of safeguards. 
Asset Presential proc current f remote proc 
current f 
files proc 
archive 
mail 
wrk-stat 
LAN 
server 
firewall 
internet 
(0,0.002,0.08,0.16) 
(0,0.01,0.05,0.13) 
(0,0.01,0.05,0.13) 
(0,0,0.01,0.05) 
(0,0.01,0.05,0.13) 
(0,0,0.03,0.09) 
(0,0,0,0.03) 
(0,0,0.02,0.08) 
(0,0,0.03,0.11) 
1 
(0.01,0.04,0.10,0.19) 
(0.01,0.04,0.10,0.19) 
(0,0.02,0.08,0.16) 
(0.01,0.04,0.09,0.17) 
(0.01,0.04,0.10,0.19) 
(0,0.03,0.10 0.22) 
(0,0.01,0.05,0.12) 
(0,0.02,0.07,0.16) 
(0,0.04,0.09,0.17) 
(0,0.01,0.05,0.11) 
(0,0.01,0.05,0.11) 
(0,0,0.01,0.04) 
(0,0.01,0.05,0.11) 
(0,0.01,0.03,0.08) 
(0,0,0,0.03) 
(0,0,0.02,0.07) 
(0,0,0.03,0.09) 
Asset 
current-f 
files-proc 
archive 
mail 
wrk-stat 
LAN 
server 
firewall 
internet 
Optimal solution 
x
3
'
2
* = (1 ,1 ,1 , 0, 0, 0, 0 , 1 , 0, 0) 
x
31
 = (0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1) 
x
4
'
3
* =(0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0) 
x
6
'
3
* =(0,1,1,0,0,1) 
x
7
'
3
* =(0,0,1,0,0,0) 
x
8
'
3
* =(0,1,0,1,1,0) 
y9,3* f0 0 0 0 1 1) 
x
5
'
3
* =(1,0,1 ,1 ,1) 
x
5
'
6
* =(1,0,0,0,1) 
y1 0 ,6* / 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ) 
x
116
* =(0,0,0,0,0,0,0) 
Cost 
639 
120 
515 
680 
143 
674 
405 
1267 
Stage 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
0 2 
0 2 
4443 
If we consider that the fuzzy threshold for keeping the failure 
transmission probabilities among support and terminal assets at 
an acceptable level is now U = (0,0,0.075,0.15), then costs associ-
ated with selected safeguards would decrease to 4443, as was 
expected since a weaker threshold is used. 
Table 13 shows the resulting selection of preventive safeguards 
and the respective costs. We have marked the differences 
regarding the solutions in Table 11 in bold. Note that the selection 
of safeguards is the same for archive, wrk-stat, server, firewall, and 
internet, five safeguards are no longer necessary and three 
additional safeguards are now selected for current-f and mail. 
5. Conclusions and future research 
We have developed a fuzzy risk analysis model for information 
systems that conforms to international standards, particularly the 
MAGERIT methodology. The model improves this methodology 
and other existing methodologies since it includes uncertainty 
about the assessments by means of linguistic terms, which corre-
spond with trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. The proposed methodology 
makes computations on the basis of trapezoidal fuzzy numbers to 
accumulate dependencies between assets and asset valuations and 
to determine impacts and risk from threat-related degradation and 
threat frequency, respectively. Moreover, similarity functions can 
be used at any step in the methodology to derive a linguistic term 
for the trapezoidal fuzzy number output. 
A model for selecting preventive safeguards to reduce risks 
based on the reduction of the degree of dependency between sup-
port assets and terminal assets has also been proposed. The aim is 
to select safeguards that minimize costs while keeping the risk at 
acceptable levels. 
Dynamic programming combined with simulated annealing 
was used because of the special structure of the constraint set. This 
leads to a more computationally efficient solution to the safeguard 
selection problem. 
We have assumed that the threat frequencies are represented 
by linguistic terms (trapezoidal fuzzy numbers). However, these 
frequencies might change depending on a number of variables in 
the context of the information system. In the future, we will intend 
to build a fuzzy control system to establish different alarm levels 
according to these variable values. 
In the future, we also intend to consider the problem of 
selecting preventive safeguards that minimize risks to information 
systems in the line with a budget allocation. 
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